



QUEEN'S INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER

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INTO AFRICA

THREE STORIES ON THE HOPE AND PROMISE OF A BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL AFRICANS

FEATURE ARTICLE

LESSONS FROM THE IRAQ CRISIS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

by JAMES COCKAYNE and DAVID MALONE





FROM THE EDITOR

The Queen's International Observer, as the Queen's International Affairs Association's official publication, strives to explore the fundamental nature of international affairs and to inspire deliberation. It is necessary that we, the students, recognize the importance of critical thought regarding international affairs. We Queen's students, have immense power to create change. In the direct future our opinions, and ideas, will propel society. Thus, it is crucial to read these articles carefully, and reflect upon their implications.

In this issue, the QIO explores three main topics. First, we explore contemporary Africa, and Canadian/African relations. From the experiences of two Queen's students, who recently visited Africa, and Queen's alumni, Xavier Furtado, we see the need for increased awareness regarding African issues. Canadians must strive to explore contemporary perceptions of Africa, and attempt to gain greater understanding of this unique nation. The second topic, similarly requires an examination of our understanding. The topic of US/Canadian rela-

We must be the change we wish to see in the world.
-- **Mahatma Gandhi**

tions, is explored in a student review of US Ambassador Paul Cellucci's visit to Queen's. Finally, this issue's feature article is by James Cockayne and David Malone, entitled "Quicksand: Lessons from the Iraq Crisis for the Future of the United Nations." In their article, Cockayne and Malone, examine the role of the UN in Iraq and the UN's relationship with the US. This article is extremely significant, given the recent developments in Middle-Eastern affairs. Ironically, "Quicksand" provides greater clarity to several issues at hand.

As stated above, a primary objective for the QIO is to inspire debate; therefore we welcome any questions, comments, or responses to the articles of this edition. I encourage all to think carefully about what follows, and to continue being active within the realm of international affairs. It is necessary to remember all great change begins with the individual.

Sincerely,

Ashley Henbrey



The Queen's International Observer is a bi-monthly publication of the Queen's International Affairs Association, containing articles and comment on world affairs, as well as reviews on QIAA activities. QIO will attempt to bridge the divide between students, academics and practitioners by giving all the opportunity and a forum to present ideas.

We will attract the brightest thinkers, with the most forward-looking opinions on international affairs and bring them together in one publication.

Editor Ashley Henbrey
Publisher Andrew Schrumm

We would like to thank all of our contributors to this issue. Without your hard work and generosity, this publication would had never have been more than an idea.

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Mark is a QIO staff writer and is an Arts '06, majoring in History.

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Paige is a contributor to the QIO and is an Arts '06, majoring in English and the International Studies Certificate. Paige visited Sudan in the summer of 2004.

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Jamie is Vice-President of QIAA, and is an Arts '05, majoring in Nursing and Development Studies. Jamie travelled to southern Africa with Queen's Medical Outreach, also in the summer of 2004.

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Xavier is a QIAA alumnus, Queen's Arts '96, and is currently working with CIDA in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He is an active member of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and has previously served at the World Bank.

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“Lessons from the Iraq Crisis for the Future of the United Nations”

by James Cockayne and David Malone

James Cockayne is the Hauser Research Scholar at NYU School of Law. A native of Australia, Mr. Cockayne is a graduate of the University of Sydney and is a solicitor of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. He interned in the Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and served as Director of the International Crime Branch of the Australian Attorney-General's Department.

David Malone is the Assistant Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Canada, responsible for Africa and the Middle East. A graduate of Oxford University, Dr. Malone has previously served as Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, as President of the International Peace Academy in New York, and with the foreign service in Egypt, Kuwait and Jordan. Dr. Malone has published extensively on peace and security issues and has taught at the University of Toronto, Columbia University, Carleton University, and New York University.

This article is comes from their upcoming book on the war in Iraq.

TALKING WITH THE NEIGHBOUR

US Ambassador Paul Cellucci speaks with Queen's students

by **Mark Williams**

In the shadow of an upcoming Presidential election, American Ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci's speech was framed with both optimism and apprehension regarding the current state of Canadian-American relations.

As the second of the Queen's International Affairs Association's Fall Speaker series, the former Massachusetts Governor was quick to emphasize the importance of Canadian diplomacy to the current Republican administration in the United States.

Despite recent controversy over what were later dismissed as "misconstrued" comments by Canadian Natural Resources Minister Herb Dhaliwal, criticizing President Bush's actions regarding Iraq, Cellucci appeared on Tuesday night with a strong message, advocating co-operation and a shared vision for the future.

At the forefront of Cellucci's message for the nearly full Ellis auditorium was a reinforced commitment to free trade and economic teamwork with Canadian commerce and industry. Describing our economic relationship with the United States as "big, important and sound", Cellucci cited the 500 billion dollar trade revenue generated between the two nations as clear evidence for the continuing prosperity fostered by co-operation.

Responding directly to controversy created in the United States and globally by President Bush's often questioned environmental policy, Cellucci furthered his argument for the necessity to co-operate. Referring directly to the "misrepresented" issue of the Kyoto Accord, which President Bush has dismissed as unrealistic in its aims, the Ambassador stressed Bush's dedication to his role as a "steward of the environment".

"Sound science", according to Cellucci, has formed the backbone of Republican environmental policies. The nearly 5.8 billion dollar annual expenditure which the United States government has spent has, according to Cellucci, been invested with the aim of reducing emissions with such philosophies in mind.

The environmental policy which Cellucci described was not, of course, without goals for the future. Mentioning such incidents as the Northeastern blackout of Summer 2003 to support his argument, Cellucci called for further upgrading of Canadian power grids and a diversification of power supplies in order to avoid any further decline in the security of the North American power system. Cellucci went on to cite Quebec as an exemplary case of this upgrading, as it had taken care to upgrade its technology following the disastrous Ice Storm of 1998.

The major issue of contention for the evening arose with the introduction by Cellucci of two subjects of great concern to Canadians: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and American foreign policy under the Bush Administration. Using the recent Presidential debates, during which Democratic Senator John Kerry has been openly critical on the subject of American outsourcing, Ambassador Cellucci was quick to step forward in support of globalized free trade agreements and American involvement in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Cellucci called for a "break [in the] log-jam" in WTO talks which would subsidize agriculture and "level the playing field" for lesser economic countries to put their goods on the market. "It is in our interest," the Ambassador said "to take advantage of these new markets".

Combining advocacy for the expansion of free trade to intercontinental



Ambassador Cellucci answers a question from the audience.

Photo: Queen's Journal

markets with a promotion of foreign aid, the Ambassador cited Mexico as an exemplary case of a "strengthened democracy" and an "increased middle class" generating wealth and prosperity through NAFTA policies. When questioned later about the presence of slums (called "maquiladoras") along the American-Mexican border, Ambassador Cellucci claimed he was unaware as to their presence, and was referring only to "what the Mexican Ambassador told [him]".

As further incentive toward opening global markets, and to appropriately segue into remarks regarding American foreign policy, Ambassador Cellucci also emphasized the importance of using free trade as a "remedy" to eliminate terrorism in foreign countries. Naming Afghanistan specifically, Ambassador Cellucci underlined the role he felt poverty played in the creation of Afghanistan as a terrorist threat to North American security.

President Bush's "faith in the transforming power of freedom", according to Cellucci, would continue to form the policies of the Administration as the

21st century progresses. Stressing once again the “real threat” posed by terrorism to all of North America, Cellucci made sure to note that the United States “cannot defend [its] homeland without Canada’s help”. Leaving the sphere of international affairs to make his closing comments of his speech, Ambassador Cellucci linked Canada’s support of the United States throughout the War on Terror and North American trade as further evidence of a “lasting bedrock of relations between Canada and the U.S.”. Returning to his opening emphasis upon co-operation and commitment to fundamental ideals between both Canada and the United States, Ambassador Cellucci paid reverence to the democratic traditions and diverse societies established in North America, and called for a continuing trend toward understanding and egalitarianism.

Following Ambassador Cellucci’s speech, the students of Queen’s University and other attendees for the evening were invited to pose questions to the Ambassador. As a gesture of goodwill, Ambassador Cellucci kindly opened the floor to unscreened questions.

The question period proved to be controversial as questions were raised regarding points of American foreign and domestic policy.

Among the most popular of questions posed were those in anticipation of and related to the upcoming Presidential Election slated for November 2nd. When asked about the import of Canadian drugs to the United States in order to reduce health costs (a question recently posed to President Bush during the second Presidential Debate in St. Louis Missouri this past week), Ambassador Cellucci stressed American desire to avoid an influx of untrustworthy 3rd World Drugs into the United States through internet purchasing and other controversial means. Instead, according to Cellucci, the “patient, doctor, pharmacist” relationship should be upheld, and Canadian drugs only administered if proven to be trustworthy.

Concerning relations with the newly elected Prime Minister Martin and the potential effects of the US election upon Canadian-American relations, Cellucci seemed resolutely assured that the friendship between the two nations would remain open and pleasant, whatever the outcome may be. The Ambassador cited the Canadian Press as the primary source for any impression of deteriorating relations between Ottawa and Washington.

The main pressure point for the evening, and a definite source of frustration among the student body present at Ambassador Cellucci’s speech was the discussion of concerns surround-

ing the invasion of Iraq and American foreign policies. When questioned about US relations with the UN, and the “violation of International Laws”, Cellucci dismissed any such accusations claiming it fell in line with the criticism inevitably received by a nation with “Superpower status”. Falling back to his comments of April 2nd, 2003, which referred to American “disappointment” over Canada’s lack of involvement in the Iraqi War, the Ambassador asserted that no diplomatic deterioration has taken place, but also stressed that American sensitivity to criticism is not unavoidable.

QIO



The Ambassador meets with QIAA members prior to his talk.

QIAA Winter Speakers Series 2005

Please join us throughout the term as we bring high-calibre speakers to campus to discuss international issues with Queen’s students.

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ON THE FOREFRONT: SUDAN

“The darkest thing about Africa has always been our ignorance of it” – *Kimble*

by **Paige Witmer**

What do you, my audience, know about Africa? My grandmother is convinced that it is a land of heathen savages, who hunt or beat the bushes for food, live in squalor in little mud huts, and pick nits from each other's hair. And - bless her soul - she was never taught anything different until it was too late to change her otherwise elegant mind. Even my parents, coming in the avalanche of post WWII babies, still have the blood of the conqueror running quickly in their veins. They are out to educate the world, and to teach the golden ways of the West to the African masses.

And now you, my contemporary, what has your ignorance brought *you* to? I'm sure you regard yourself as an educated individual, enrolled in an upstanding institution, aspiring to make your way into the golden future. But what do you know about Africa? You probably know Africa as a land where warriors brutally massacre their neighboring tribes, the hungry subsist on UN dole or die waiting for it, and those little mud huts that are left are probably going to be useless in a couple of years anyway because they are surely not as solid as your ghetto-quarters. Tell me, how are you better than my grandmother?

Of the fifty-four countries people offhandedly refer to as Africa, a population more than double that of North America is born, lives, and dies with as much importance as any birth, life, and death in your home town. And these births, lives, and deaths, are often fraught with just as much emotion, intelligence, and history as your own. And yet, Africa has become the subject of Western pity, where we write resolutions and donate money to further the cause of “peace”. How will a boardroom be able to decide on the proper way to make peace, unless they have been through conflict,

unless they have seen the ground itself where the fighting is taking place? One should “know” a place before one can make opinions about it.

Take Sudan, the leading headlines of papers worldwide assault international audiences with peace allegations, and demand closure for the millions of displaced peoples of the tenth largest country in the world. The international forum takes up this anti-war cry, but this is nothing more than a chanted dirge to the millions already dead.

Overall, British colonization proved to be fairly successful on the road to independence for most nations - in contrast to other colonizing powers which would be futile to name as they are nails already in the coffin. But Sudan's independence, in 1956, led to very little peace. The borders of Sudan were cut in a boardroom in Europe, and now the repercussions are unfolding. Independence showed that the clean-cut borders, which look so pretty on a map, were not indigenous to the nation. With coast line, desert, and forests; Sudan touches Egypt in the north, and Kenya in the south, it borders the CAR and the DRC; Ethiopia, Uganda, Libya, Chad...and the tribes are even more numerous. The south is tropical, the north is a desert. How do we ignore what is evident? The strife of today lies in the ignorance of history; the world is not clean cut, it is diverse and intricate.

This summer I was able to visit Lokichoggio, the largest UN relief camp in the world. Its sole purpose is to provide a basic meal each day to the thousands of displaced persons in southern Sudan. On the forefront, this is a good cause. Every day, numerous Hercules transporters soar into the sky at daybreak, disgorging gunny-sacs filled with the basic mil-

let/meal by the ton. Half a million U.S. dollars a day goes into the fuel costs and maintenance of the airplanes soaring over southern Sudan just above the anti-aircraft gun's reach, and the U.S. dollars are reflected by the imprint of U.S.A. in bold blue on otherwise unmarked bags. But this half million does not account for the cost of the food, the salaries of the pilots, or anything else involved in moving the unfathomable quantities of food to the desert surrounding Loki.

To put things in perspective for myself I began to ask about the various prices of the planes, about the time it took to transport food from the fertile southern Kenya, and the amount of personnel needed to get one of the over thirty planes into the air for just one of the daily four to five flights. But the importance of this frantic beehive seemed to shrink before my eyes when I looked out beyond the hills of Loki, and into Sudan. Southern Sudan is as lush as anyone's Eden. A Kenyan told me that the forests just over the hills of Loki used to be full of elephants...they're all gone now. You cannot even find a goat anymore. This land of milk and honey is being fed by tin birds, and will continue to be fed thus unless the world begins to understand Sudan's situation better.

The Loki projects have been going on for ten years now. An old missionary nurse told me that when she first arrived in Loki, it was a single rocky strip where an old plane came once a week to drop off some medicines and a couple food treats. She vaguely mapped out the gradual expansion of the airfield, which is now lined with high-quality tents, and is buzzing day-in/day-out with the drone of the “ndege” – a Swahili word with the dual meanings of bird and plane. She was generally unimpressed with the whole operation. Her main concern was that the Sudanese be allowed to take their own initiative. In her time, she had



In all conflict, children become victims no matter which side of the conflict they are on.

Photos: Courtesy Author

set up and trained an entire staff for a clinic; which she has now left to their own. She had put her faith in the people.

Although this missionary lady had put her faith in the people, the UN staff continually reminded me that the people had no way to come to their own in Sudan. I was privileged to get a seat on a plane doing a puddle jump within Kenya. As we took off I again saw the lush countryside of Sudan that spread deep into the country just beyond the Loki hills, but below us, dry riverbeds fanned out like the veins of dried leaves, and the only visible life we saw was the arrow straight road the NGO's had built for transport along the Sudan border. Presently, we flew over the refugee camps of Kakuma where eighty thousand people are currently living, seventy thousand of them from Sudan. The country that these people had fled was far more suitable for life than the volcanic "bad lands" in which their tin hovels

were arranged in geometric patterns.

I found out that the UN is planning to take these seventy thousand Sudanese and put them back into "their nation" within the next two years. Why two years? In two years, an election has been scheduled to decide on separation, north from south. But with the south virtually empty, no such separation would ever take place. Those who may attempt to speak are declared unworthy of a voice; the empty south is as good as a void ballot!

But consider, hypothetically, that the UN were able to ship all seventy thousand back to their nation, into the jungles and pastures they have deserted on pain of death. Will they want to go? Although their living conditions are below those any of us can imagine, they still have water and food provided to them daily in the camp. The basic necessities of life are cared for. Also, what they left behind no longer

exists. Their villages, gardens, and herds survive only in their memory. This was their subsistence. Without their land and their wealth (often calculated in herds), they have nothing. Is the UN trying to return a nation to a dead land?

The refugee camp is a black hole for culture. It has been explained to me, and I will explain to you, how a culture group can lose its ability to survive in the outside world within six years of internment at a refugee camp. This is possible because of the generational gap. The children, ages zero to six, know of no world but the refugee camps. The seven to twelve year olds have not been culturally adapted to their native lands. This age period is a key time where the youngsters often tend the herds or help in the family garden learning about the seasons and different characteristics specific to their traditional regions. Those who are thirteen to eighteen years

old, although they may have been taught as children about their village area, their thought process has been warped by war, and most have no desire to settle down to farm or herd. But these children are knowledgeable about guns, free food, and war. This is the catalyst of the downward spiral, because those who are eighteen years of age and older can choose to leave the camps and join militia forces. These are the feeder groups of the gorilla groups and militias that fuel civil strife. Therefore, the refugee camps often breed the forces of conflict. And for those who are too old to join the rebel or government factions, they are also too old to start over even if given the chance. And as the generations age, the knowledge of the land dies with the elders, since they have no means to teach it to the younger generations. So much of their knowledge is based on interaction and experience, not the textbook knowledge we place so much faith in, that it is necessary to have the land to teach about the land.

So how do you entice the populace of the refugee camps back into their land after it has been both raped and mutilated? That is the question that still needs an answer. After ten years, it seems almost hopeless to get the generations to re-establish themselves in their home territories. Would the UN drop every family, every individual, back at their old village site? Would they provide an initial ten cows and five goats to start the families back up? The logistics of this is even more staggering than the simple feat of transporting seventy thousand people back across a war-torn border. And yet, you and I will both agree that it is not fair that these people remain in exile with no possible hope of a solution.

Sudan has great reservoirs of wealth. It has oil (this should ring a bell as to why there is encouraged conflict), minerals, and enormous hydropower. The oil being piped out of Sudan cannot be blamed on any one company or country. Canada is as much to blame for exploitation in this area as anyone else, having helped to build the pipeline. But, considering



recent events concerning oil in the Middle East, I would not say it is too far off to assume that there are new boardrooms dividing up the spoils of Africa. The minerals include silver and gold, but the hydropower has potential to run north-west Africa or more; this would be assuming Sudan were allowed to control the Nile. Instead, Egypt controls the Nile because they have passed hydro-political agreements stating that the Nile may not be dammed above Aswan, a city far from Sudan's reach.

And so, history has played a fast one on the people of Sudan. They were placed in the modern world within boundaries that did not suit their history. How often is this the

case? It is up to you to find out. You must seek to learn more than what is offered to you. William Burchell said: "Nothing but breathing the air of Africa, and actually walking through it, can communicate the indescribable sensations." But I can understand ... you may not have the opportunity to cast aside time and soar to the other side of the globe. So take what I have written, and then build on it; don't stop when you put down this paper, continue to learn so that you cannot be charged with ignorance of "the dark continent".

There's always something new out of Africa.

- Aristotle

QIO

"KILLING TIME"

The urgency of facing HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa

by **Jamie White**, QIAA VP

As of January 2004 there were over 22 million people in sub-Saharan Africa living with HIV and the number of AIDS deaths rose to over 2.2 million (UNAIDS). In order to truly understand the significance of the HIV/AIDS pandemic it is imperative to look beyond those statistics and try to understand its applied effects. HIV/AIDS primarily impacts people aged 15-45, a demographic comprising a large part of the national workforce, educational sector and accounting for over 60% of national production (UNAIDS). HIV/AIDS is ripping apart families, orphaning millions of children and devastating economic and social sectors of society. The World Health Organization has recently stated that several nations in Sub-Saharan Africa have surpassed a critical point in the epidemic (a prevalence rate greater than 20%) that once crossed, may be irreversible (i.e. Lesotho, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Keeping this in mind, it is troubling that international dialogue on HIV/AIDS focuses on the epidemic as just one of many challenges facing Africa. African and Western leaders are failing to recognize the increased importance of HIV in relation to issues such as good governance, foreign investment, corruption, educational and agricultural reform and the implementation of NEPAD. It is imperative that political leaders, policy makers and investors in Africa begin to challenge their perceptions of HIV/AIDS, seeing it not only as one of the challenges, but rather, as the fundamental cause of Africa's developmental plight. While there has been increasing awareness surrounding the social contributors to HIV, there has been a significant underestimation of HIV as the root cause of economic and social developmental concerns. Current initiatives that seek to control the HIV epidemic are undertaken with no more urgency than initiatives that focus on



foreign investment, corruption and security. What must be clarified is that economic and political initiatives are ineffectual unless undertaken with an understanding of the importance of HIV in determining their success. Poverty and HIV exist in a reciprocal relationship, and while initiatives to develop governments and increase foreign investment may succeed in reducing poverty levels they will not immediately impact the HIV infection rate. In fact, without an effective action plan to address HIV, poverty and social degradation will continue to increase regardless of foreign investment or the elimination of governmental corruption. African and Western development is ignoring the importance of HIV as a determinant of African social and political stability. The dialogue and understanding of HIV must begin to focus on the relationship between poverty and HIV and it must begin to address HIV/AIDS beyond a scope of primary care initiatives. Primary care and sexual health education are not effectively addressing the pandemic, which can largely be attributed to the failure of development initiatives in other sectors to effectively include HIV in their creation and implementation. Financial investment, governmental reform and other programmes must embrace an understanding of HIV's impact in order to be effective in the reduction of poverty and the creation of sustainable development.

Canada can play a part in challenging the dominant view of HIV/AIDS in Africa by advocating the importance of the epidemic in creating social and political instability. Canada has been a leading contributor of medical personnel, generic drugs and educational programming in the primary care approach to the pandemic and while maintaining that support, can extend their focus. Canada must urge foreign investors, western governments and African leaders to utilize an upstream approach to African development, centralizing HIV/AIDS as the predominant cause of socio-economic and political challenges. HIV/AIDS must be controlled through effective and sustainable initiatives before changes to government and investment can be made effective. Of course, the implementation of an effective HIV reduction campaign requires local governments to be organized and stable, and therefore, concurrent development initiatives to improve government and reduce HIV are likely to be valuable. Foreign investment and aid (both bilateral and multilateral) need to be directed towards resolution of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in order to stabilize the region and increase the likelihood of success in economic and social development initiatives.

In conclusion, the purpose of this paper was neither to outline an effective HIV/AIDS programme nor to

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CANADA AND ETHIOPIA

New Frontiers in Development Cooperation

by **Xavier Furtado**, Arts '96

I did not set out from Queen's wanting to work in the public service, development or Africa. But life takes one in new and interesting directions. I joined the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 2000, and just over four years later, I find myself working at the Canadian Embassy in Ethiopia. Like Kevin Rex (Arts '95), whose personal reflections on his time at the Agency were captured in the first issue of the *QIO*, my time at CIDA has been a rewarding experience. This is not because I harbour any illusions about saving the world. Rather, I have discovered that development is a first-rate intellectual challenge, and evolutions in global and national policy have made it an exciting time to be in the business of development cooperation.

Perhaps nowhere is this more true than in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is one of the very poorest countries in the world, with a per-capita annual income of approximately US \$100. Ethiopia ranks 170th out of 177 on the UN's Human Development Index. Upon birth, Ethiopians have a 57 percent chance of surviving to age 40. Literacy hovers around 40 percent. 76 percent of the population does not have access to clean water, and 47 percent of all children are underweight for their age. As Africa's second most populous country (a fact overlooked by many), these statistics take on staggering (sometimes unfathomable) human dimensions. Twenty years after Bob Geldof's Live Aid, Ethiopia has changed considerably, but many of the challenges facing Ethiopians have not.

In spite of these gruesome realities, Canada's has historically had a relatively modest development cooperation programme in Ethiopia. For many years, CIDA's bilateral programme (excluding emergency assistance and food aid) averaged \$7.5 million per year, and was focused in two sectors: good governance and

food security/agriculture. While these may seem like a large sum, it is modest given Ethiopia's enormous difficulties.

All this began to change in 2002. Prime Minister Chrétien's announcement at the International Conference on Financing for Development to increase the government's budget for official development assistance (ODA) set the stage for Canada to play a more prominent and influential role in international development. The government of the day then used its position as host of the G8 Summit to focus high level attention on Africa's plight and mobilize the political, bureaucratic and financial resources to do more in the service of poverty reduction. Towards the end of 2002, CIDA selected Ethiopia as one of nine countries of focus. These major initiatives and events resulted in Canada deciding that it will dramatically increase its annual development assistance to Ethiopia over the next three to four years.

While this reflects a dramatic change in the level of Canada's engagement, perhaps of greater significance are the changes now taking place to *how* Canada is deploying its ODA. Historically, aid was delivered in the form of projects. Funds delivered through projects supported discrete sets of activities that were designed to reach a series of pre-defined outputs and outcomes. While many projects did have significant developmental benefits, they often came with onerous reporting requirements and included few incentives for donors to coordinate their efforts. Recipient country officials were left to cope with a myriad of donor-specific reporting and management issues. The transaction costs of aid (i.e., in terms of time, energy and money) were very high and, more often than not, borne

by developing country governments.

In order to improve the overall effectiveness of ODA, donor agencies began to move away from this projectized approach towards what is known as the 'program-based approach' (PBA). Through PBAs, donors pool their efforts and resources in support of specific poverty-related sectors, such as health, education and agriculture. The purpose is to make aid more effective by enhancing donor coordination and, thus, reduce the transaction costs of development assistance.

Canada is moving aggressively in this direction in Ethiopia. In the area of food security/ agriculture, CIDA is working with other donors and the government to build Ethiopia's capacity to protect the needs of its most vulnerable citizens in times of food and health crises. With respect to governance, CIDA is planning a major investment in a nation-wide effort to build public sector capacity at all levels and in a variety of areas, including public financial management, agriculture, health and education.

In addition to these two sectors, where Canada has established its credibility through long historical involvement, CIDA is planning to provide Ethiopia with direct budgetary support (DBS) for poverty reduction. DBS is the newest (and, perhaps, the most controversial) dimension of CIDA's growing programme in Ethiopia. (An example of the 'new frontier' mentioned in the title of this piece.) It involves providing funds directly to Ethiopia's national treasury for the government to allocate across the priorities stipulated in its national poverty reduction strategy. As one might imagine, this particular approach to delivering ODA has attracted significant attention and, in some cases, criticism. Conventional wisdom says that all African governments are bas-

tions of corruption, and that providing DBS would waste public resources. Moreover, because DBS funds are pooled with those of the recipient government and other donors, it is impossible to track the use of our funds and, in so doing, plant the Canadian flag on specific projects and initiatives (which can make for good politics back home).

Two key issues should be kept in mind. First, a closer look at Ethiopia reveals a country that does not suffer from a high degree of corruption. Ethiopia's biggest governance challenge is the lack of available capacity, not malfeasance. IMF and World Bank assessments of public spending in Ethiopia over the years show a government that has devoted an increasing share of its national resources to poverty-related sectors. Second, as Canada expands its use of PBAs, it is consciously moving away from historical preoccupations with 'planting the flag'. The focus now is on ensuring that governments spend more on poverty-related sectors and, in so doing, achieve important development results. The ultimate focus is on using the aid budget more effectively (which, incidentally, is also about spending Canadian tax dollars more wisely).

It is worth noting that Canada is not alone in deciding to provide Ethiopia with budgetary support. Both the European Union and the United Kingdom have already provided DBS. Furthermore, the World Bank (where Canada holds a seat on the Board of Directors) provided its first tranche of budgetary support in January of 2004, and is now preparing its second for later this year or early next. Finally,

the African Development Bank's Board of Directors (where, again, Canada holds a seat) approved its budgetary support operation in October. Not only is this important as a point of reassurance, but through effective collaboration with other like-minded agencies (especially powerful ones, like the World Bank), CIDA is able to enhance its leverage over key points of policy in discussions with Ethiopian authorities.

This evolving approach to development cooperation is forcing changes to how CIDA and the Canadian government operate. CIDA officers are now called upon to provide analysis and advice on key policy issues, rather than focus on the transactions involved in project management. This level of policy dialogue requires a sound understanding of macroeconomics, budget processes, sector-specific technical issues and, my favourite, the politics of government decision-making. CIDA has begun to address these challenges by changing the skills profile of the people it hires at headquarters and sends to its missions abroad. Furthermore, as our engagement abroad intensifies, we are striving to coordinate more effectively with our colleagues in other government departments, such as Foreign Affairs Canada and the Department of National Defence ... another part of my work that I really enjoy.

The fun does not stop. Tony Blair's government in the UK has taken a leadership role on African issues by forming the Commission for Africa (commonly referred to as the Blair Commission). Canada's Minister of Finance, Ralph Goodale, is a member of the Commission alongside Ethio-

pia's Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi. The Commission met from October 7 to 8 here in Addis to discuss new approaches to addressing Africa's dire needs. These proposals will be finalized in a report to be presented in April 2005. The UK will hold the presidency of the European Union as well as host the G8 Summit in 2005. The Blair government will, thus, have a unique opportunity to continue the global momentum around Africa.

As I mentioned at the outset, this is an exciting time to be working in international development. Though I did not leave Queen's with this occupation in mind, intellectual and personal flexibility are the keys. My career path has, thus far, never wanted for interesting work. At times, it almost seems like too much of a good thing.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDA or any other part of the Government of Canada.

¹ The nine countries of focus are: Bangladesh; Bolivia; Ethiopia; Ghana; Honduras; Mali; Mozambique; Senegal; and Tanzania. These countries were selected due to their deep poverty, demonstrated ability to use aid effectively and the quality of their policy and institutional environments. In selecting these countries, CIDA set a framework that is helping to ensure that these new resources (the public's tax dollars, after all!) are spent where they are needed most and will be utilized effectively.

² But don't take my word for it! Interested readers who want to know more should see the Country Financial and Accountability Assessment that was published in 2003 (www.countryanalyticwork.net). Other diagnostics exist, including the HIPC Public Expenditure System and Action Plan. This fall, the donor community will be undertaking a fiduciary assessment to update some of these diagnostics.

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make recommendations for Canadian aid. It's purpose was to underline the importance of moving past an understanding of HIV as one of the challenges facing Africa and begin to understand it as the root cause of the problems evident in current African development initiatives. We must move beyond the statistics, understand the epidemic in the context of

its consequences and begin to face it as urgently as those affected. It is only once the developed world realizes the urgency and importance of aggressively fighting the HIV pandemic that African nations can begin to effectively utilize foreign investment and successfully reduce poverty. HIV can no longer be viewed as a disease afflicting the impoverished and marginalized, but must be understood as a disease creating poverty and under-

mining attempts at development. Controlling the epidemic must become a global priority, for continuing along the path of development without an effective HIV/AIDS approach will only exacerbate the challenges facing Africans, their families and their governments. Valuable time and resources are being wasted on ineffectual development initiatives, and as a result, Africa's people are dying by the thousands.

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LESSONS FROM THE IRAQ CRISIS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE U.N.

by **James Cockayne** and **David Malone**

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) has been engaged in peace-making activities in Iraq since 1980, when the Iran-Iraq war first broke out. In almost a quarter of a century of engagement, the UN has brokered peace, monitored a ceasefire, authorized military action to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, administered complex sanctions and weapons inspection regimes and, finally, stood impotent, as the United States and United Kingdom led an invasion to remove Saddam Hussein and permanently disarm Iraq of any weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The UN's inability to restrain the US and UK has caused a crisis of legitimacy, even leading its Secretary General Kofi Annan to appoint a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which is to report in December 2004 on possible reforms to the Organization to restore its legitimacy. The Crisis itself is, however, instructive of the strengths and weaknesses of the Organization, and how it might best be oriented to meet the challenges ahead. In this article, we reflect on how the Iraq Crisis played out through the UN, and what lessons it holds for the future of the Organization. Given limitations of space and not wishing to tax the patience of readers well acquainted with recent news, we compress many of these developments. Instead, our narrative presents a broad overview of the UN's role in Iraq in four periods: from 2001 until the Coalition invasion on March 19, 2003; from invasion to the bombing of UN headquarters in Baghdad; the implications of that bombing; and the period since. Finally, we examine the implications of these events for the UN's future role in promoting world order.

September 11, 2001 to March 19, 2003: the UN as one coalition among many?

The terrorist attacks on American soil of September 11, 2001 radically altered the strategic calculus of key decision-makers in the United States. All too suddenly, the strategy of containment underpinning the inspections-plus-sanctions regime imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War appeared to many of them as inadequate. The risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by a wide range of actors from Saddam Hussein to terrorists – or even a closer strategic partnership between the two groups – became a point of obsession for a number of policy-makers in an atmosphere of national apprehension.¹ Against this backdrop, having first addressed the immediate threat of Al Qa'ida and its host Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the US, ultimately without the authorization of the Security Council, led a new push for disarmament of Iraq and the overthrow

of Saddam Hussein, precipitating a crisis for UN norms and institutions.

In the first half of 2001, the Security Council's inspections-plus-sanctions approach instituted by Resolution 687 was in some disarray. After French support shifted between 1996 and 1998 away from the aggressive US-UK approach to upholding this strategy towards the more conciliatory Russian and Chinese approach, both the inspections and sanctions regimes were gradually rolled back. The procedures of the sanctions regime had slowly been reformed, to allow for greater oil export revenues and consequently more humanitarian imports. Sanctions fatigue slowly turned to sanctions defeatism.² Inspections had been suspended following Operation Desert Fox in December 1998. By 2001, patience with the inspections-plus-sanctions approach was wearing thin, both in capitals, and amongst democratic electors. Deep divisions amongst the P-5 remained. Where the Russians, French and Chinese preferred to mitigate sanctions and move back, away from the intrusive inspections-plus-sanctions regulatory approach to a more traditional model of inspections as a tool for containment, the US and UK still aimed for permanent Iraqi disarmament.

Slowly, common ground emerged between these divergent approaches, aiming at relaxing sanctions while bringing further pressure to bear on Saddam to cooperate with weapons inspectors inspections. But Saddam remained defiant, convinced perhaps that the US and UK would never lift sanctions while he was in power, no matter what he revealed or how he limited his military capacity, and sensing, perhaps, the deepening divisions between the members of the P-5.³ After September 11, 2001, the US and the UK became intent on removing Hussein from power, once and for all.⁴ Within the Bush Administration, there was a determination not to allow the terrorist threat represented by Al Qa'ida to come together with the WMD threat which, in American eyes, Saddam Hussein had come to symbolise. The US-UK approach to inspections became more aggressive. By November 2002, they had forged agreement amongst the P-5 to force resumption of inspections, giving the inspections-plus-sanctions approach one final chance.

In Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002, the Security Council decided that Iraq had been and remained in 'material breach' of its disarmament obligations, and gave it one 'final opportunity' to comply with those obligations, failing which it would face 'serious consequences'. Resolution 1441 required Iraq not only to agree to allow the inspections of the UN Monitoring and Verification Commission

(UNMOVIC) to resume, but also to provide a complete and final disclosure of WMD activities. The Bush Administration congratulated itself for what it considered a neat trap: if Hussein admitted possessing WMD, he was acknowledging a violation of UN resolutions; if he did not, he would be deceiving the world, and again violating those resolutions.⁵ Either way, the UN would have delivered the US the legitimacy it sought for armed intervention. (That, of course, assumed that Hussein *had* WMD. Ultimately, it was this misreading which hoist the US on Iraq's non-existent petards.⁶)

At first, the apparent consensus embodied in Resolution 1441's creatively ambiguous language of 'material breach' and 'serious consequences' held. Hussein delivered a document purporting to be a 'full disclosure' on time, by December 7, 2002, but Hans Blix, the veteran Swedish lawyer-diplomat now leading UNMOVIC reported on January 27, 2003, that "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it"⁷. In response, Iraq increased cooperation – and it was here that the veneer of P-5 unity began to dissolve. France, Russia and China pointed to limited UNMOVIC evidence as indicating the need for further inspections, while the US, and to a lesser extent the UK, pointed to Iraqi behaviour, rather than specific evidence, as the basis for moving from inspections to enforcement.⁸ US Secretary of State Colin Powell presented a detailed dossier of evidence of Iraqi deception to the Security Council on February 5, 2003,⁹ but when on February 14, Blix not only cast doubt on some of Powell's claims but also claimed that Iraq had decided to cooperate with inspectors, the US derided the prospects of successful inspections.

Embarrassingly for the US and the UK, the UN's agencies in UNMOVIC and the IAEA began to produce tentative evidence of Western intelligence failures, visiting sites identified by the US and UK without finding anything of substance.¹⁰ The IAEA declared that Iraq was not in the process of reconstituting its nuclear programme.¹¹ The US began to disagree openly with some of the tactics adopted by Blix, who had deliberately established a more arm's length relationship with Western intelligence agencies than had his UNSCOM predecessor, Richard Butler.¹² Despite – or perhaps even because of – this increasing gap between what the UN was producing (doubt) and what the US had sought from it (legitimacy), the US commitment to war intensified. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair pushed hard for a second UN resolution,¹³ but when it became clear that a vote would only expose further the already public P-5 rift and that the votes required to carry a second resolution were in doubt, the US and UK acted beyond the Security Council, unilaterally invading Iraq on March 19, 2003.

This seemed to signal a new approach by the US, looking to the UN as just one potential source of legitimacy and support, one coalition among many. The unique features of UN legitimacy, including its alignment with international legality, were understood; but in the end, if the UN did not offer a readily usable path for the achievement of US foreign policy goals, the US would dispense with it. Even during the drama, WMD seemed to many only to represent a

convenient spin for selling a decision to go to war that – as appeared later to be confirmed¹⁴ – had already been made in Washington. On this issue, the US approached the UN instrumentally: the existing UN resolutions seemed to offer a ready-made *casus belli* linking Iraq with the threat of WMD proliferation, and going to the UN helped to keep the US' key ally, the UK, on board. Bush's speech to the General Assembly on September 12, 2002,¹⁵ warning the UN of an imminent choice between supporting the US or being deemed irrelevant, had not been idle talk: when the UN Security Council did not, ultimately, offer the US the legitimacy it had hoped for, it had little of importance to offer the US.

Lawrence Freedman has characterised the invasion of Iraq as 'something of an experiment' by the Western powers, using a pre-emptive strategy rather than a responsive one.¹⁶ But it equally introduced new tensions in US-UN (and trans-Atlantic) relations. When the UN and some NATO members offered significant resistance, they were jettisoned from US plans until their potential usefulness could be tested again in the mopping-up phase of operations.

March 19, 2003 to August 19, 2003: UN sidelined

The US-led invasion of Iraq, which highlighted the willingness on the part of the US to bypass the UN, brought to a head two growing sources of criticism of the UN. One critique held that the failure of the UN's inspections-plus-sanctions approach to Iraq proved the UN's ineffectiveness and growing irrelevance. Another held, almost conversely, that it was the UN's failure to contain the US, rather than Iraq, that proved its ineffectiveness and irrelevance. So serious was this crisis of legitimacy that the Secretary-General decided to establish a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which reports in December 2004, presenting member states with a number of ideas and options for more effective UN action against global threats, including suggestions for institutional reform. As we go to print, the outcome of these creative recommendations remains in doubt.

For most of 2003, the UN was largely sidelined on security issues in Iraq. In early April, Secretary-General Annan appointed Rafeuddin Ahmed, a low-key, senior Pakistani UN official with development experience admired for his wisdom, as his Special Adviser, to coordinate thinking on the role the UN could play in post-conflict Iraq. This was highly controversial, as any significant UN presence could be seen as retrospectively legitimating the Coalition invasion. However, at a senior level the majority UN view was that regardless of the legality of the Coalition action, the UN could not shirk its humanitarian and peace-building vocations in Iraq. The Coalition, however, seemed uninterested in any significant UN role beyond humanitarian assistance. A sensitive issue was the role the UN could play in political transitions in Iraq, not least respecting the end of Coalition authority and military occupation. On May 22, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1483, which legitimised the administrative role of the Coalition Provisional

Authority, while requesting the appointment by the Secretary-General of a Special Representative to Iraq (SRSG). The SRSG was mandated to coordinate action in the areas of humanitarian relief, reconstruction, infrastructure rehabilitation, legal and judicial reforms, human rights and return of refugees, and also to assist with civilian police.¹⁷ Additionally, the resolution authorised the Coalition Provisional Authority, "working with" the SRSG, to appoint an interim Iraqi administration.¹⁸

Annan appointed Sergio Vieira de Mello, the charismatic former head of the UN's post-conflict mission in East Timor (UNTAET) to the key post of SRSG, taking him away from

Since 1980 the United Nations has had an influential presence in Iraq - yet today, in a post-Saddam era, it's presence is needed more than ever.

his responsibilities as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for a projected four months. Soon after de Mello's arrival in Baghdad, it became clear that the US would allow him only a very limited role in the development of a permanent Iraqi constitution, the holding of elections, and the establishment of a government (thus rejecting a template for UN involvement developed in East Timor and applied in Afghanistan). Thus, the UN was to be confined almost exclusively to a technical role with the US continuing to call the shots. This was not to be a UN peace operation in any traditional sense.

In this uncertain atmosphere, Annan played a delicate diplomatic game, carefully preparing the ground so that the UN would have the support it needed in the capitals that mattered to move into action on a broader footing when the time was right (clearly not yet). He envisaged a broad, multidisciplinary assistance operation, going even further than past peace operations in including the World Bank and the IMF from the outset. In a report to the Security Council on July 17, 2003, he set out a range of tasks which the UN might undertake in Iraq, relevant to the constitutional process, judicial and legal reform, police training, demobilization and reintegration of former military forces, public administration, economic reconstruction and sustainable development, and technical assistance and advisory services to Iraqi ministries.¹⁹ These activities were to be discharged by a UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI), totaling around 300 local and international staff. At the same time, he brought pressure to bear on the Coalition to lay out a clear timetable for the withdrawal of occupying forces. Given the complex security situation in Iraq, it was widely thought that any such withdrawal would ideally be followed by the deployment of a significant UN security operation, if feasible in terms of Iraqi sensitivities. Whether such a Mission may one day be mandated remains an open question

today.

August 19, 2003: the UN's September 11

On August 19, 2003, the UN suffered the largest loss of life of its civilian employees in its history. A massive truck-bomb was detonated at the corner of the UNAMI headquarters in Baghdad, directly under de Mello's office, killing him and 21 others, and wounding 150 more. The terrorist attack shocked the UN community, and cast doubt over the security of its remaining staff in Iraq. After a second attack within a month left 20 injured, with the International Red Cross headquarters in Baghdad soon after being decimated by a bomb attack, Annan downsized the UN presence radically.²⁰ An independent inquiry condemned what it described as a failure to provide adequate security to UN staff in Iraq.²¹ The bombing made clear that the UN's existing security management structures were woefully inadequate, and would need radical surgery if the UN was to continue to play its key role within some of the world's hottest spots, in an age of transnational terrorism. Three key changes resulted from this report. First, in a much-publicised move, Annan took strong disciplinary measures against senior UN staff.²² Second, in a profound but largely unheralded move away from traditional doctrine, the UN moved to engage a private firm to provide security for its global operations.²³ Third, in resolution 1546, adopted in early June 2004, the Security Council for the first time supported the creation of a distinct component within a UN-authorised multinational force devoted specifically to UN security.²⁴

The attacks on UN staff made clear two other aspects of the new operational environment. First, the attacks signaled that the UN's traditional image of impartiality was once again under attack, this time from Islamic fundamentalists who saw the UN as a stooge for Western interests. The UN had long been a target of violence in states in which it operated. The UN had also learned, in Bosnia and Rwanda, that impartiality cannot be equated with moral equivalence among the parties to a conflict, or with unwillingness to intervene to prevent atrocities.²⁵ Iraq cruelly reminded the UN that some interventions would make even its most senior officials the target of violence.²⁶ Second, the attacks drove home that terrorism posed a fundamental threat not only to the US, but also to the UN.²⁷ The diffuse and asymmetric nature of terrorism calls for a different kind of international policing, with a greater focus on cooperative regulation. As a consequence, some states are increasingly pushing to use Chapter VII powers of the Security Council not as the basis for UN peace-keeping, but as the basis for global legislation and regulation of terrorism. This regulatory style emerged first in the 1990s with the establishment of the ad hoc criminal tribunals and the Oil-For-Food program in Iraq, but it has moved to center stage with the establishment and operation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee under Resolution 1373, and with the criminalization of activities resulting in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) under resolution 1540.²⁸ Thus, in the future, UN peace-keeping may have to

compete for scarce resources with other forms of UN security regulation.

Terrorism also offers an entirely new set of parameters for UN peace operations, as the Iraq experience makes clear.²⁹ It offers a new justification for UN intervention, not only as a response to state failure, but also as a measure to prevent state failure lest it provide the conditions for the incubation of transnational terrorism. The rise of transnational terrorism may also affect the strategies of state-building adopted by the UN, placing a premium on the short-term establishment of a strong state that can combat terrorism, with the transition to democratic statehood remaining a longer-term goal.³⁰ That inevitably risks undermining long-held goals relating to the promotion of the rule of law in state-building, as we have seen with the West's frequent support for warlords in post-Taliban Afghanistan.³¹ At the time of writing, the ascendancy of the CIA-backed strongman Allawi in Iraq, left questions hanging over the commitment of central Iraqi authorities to the rule of law country-wide.

One dangerous outgrowth of the August 19, 2003 bombing has arguably been an overreaction among UN staff that has risked paralyzing the UN's capacity to respond meaningfully to those Iraqi needs that the organization might best be placed to address. Grief and rage among UN staff over the carnage ran deep. Internal criticism of Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his senior staff for allowing a UN deployment to Baghdad in dangerous circumstances grew. UN staff sought sympathy and expressed resentment at Annan's attempts to forge a bridge between the Coalition occupiers and the rest of the international community in support of Iraqi needs. Increasingly, it seemed to be Annan's political judgment, not the UN's security mistakes, that some staff were targeting. Over time this staff discontent has led to perverse results. The UN's new representative in Baghdad, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, insisted mid-2004 that security is "not only the first consideration, it is the first priority, the second priority and the third priority" for his Baghdad mission.³² But if UN staff security is the UN's only significant priority and if Annan's margin for diplomatic and operational manoeuvre is to be constrained by staff challenges to his judgment, the UN will simply not be able to play much of a role in Iraq, or indeed in any of the theatres of war where it is most needed.³³

After August 19, 2003: the UN as escape route?

The attacks on the UN in Iraq in August and September 2003 were by no means isolated, but part of a much wider deterioration in security. The Coalition appeared at times to drift from crisis to crisis, unable to meet the most basic security needs of Iraq's citizens and increasingly abandoning its vaunted economic reconstruction objectives.³⁴ An October 2003 resolution of the Security Council reaffirmed the 'vital role' of the UN in humanitarian relief, reconstruction, development and the transition to representative government, but did not significantly broaden its mandate beyond calling on the UN to support the constitutional drafting processes established by the Iraqi Governing Council.³⁵ The

resolution also authorized the presence of a multinational security force in Iraq under US command, indicating that the UN would not take over security obligations in post-conflict Iraq any time soon. However, by November, the situation had become so dire for the US-led Coalition that the Bush Administration was once again ready to contemplate a significant UN role in Iraq. Annan argued that more time was needed for the security situation to be assessed

Terrorism offers a new justification for UN intervention, not only as a response to state failure, but also as a measure to prevent state failure.

and for the US plans to become clear. He waited until December 10 to name a replacement for de Mello, even then naming only an Acting SRSG.

Coalition forces captured Saddam Hussein on December 14, 2003. Sensing that the moment provided "an opportunity for a new beginning in the vital task of helping Iraqis take control of their destiny", Annan pushed for the Security Council to clarify the UN's future role in Iraq.³⁶ By mid-January 2004, consensus emerged that the UN should play an advisory role on the timing and organization of elections. The Coalition and Iraqi authorities were pushing for elections before June 30, 2004, when the Coalition aimed to 'hand over' sovereignty to Iraqis, well before the US Presidential elections in November 2004. On February 3, Annan was invited to the White House, in a sign of how far the Bush administration's earlier antipathy to the UN had been reversed. Now, it seemed to look to the UN as its escape-route from the quicksand of Iraq.

By February 7 a UN team led by the Secretary-General's Special Adviser – Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian diplomat and chief architect of the eponymous 2000 Report on Peace Operations – had arrived in Iraq to discuss with Iraqis and the Coalition possible ways forward towards representative government, including the possibility of elections before the end of June 2004. The team also included the head of the UN's Electoral Assistance Unit, Carina Perelli, and two members of her staff. By the end of February 2004, Brahimi had brokered an understanding over the timing of elections: there was broad agreement that they could not safely and properly be conducted before June 30, 2004. Instead, the UN would work with Coalition and Iraqi authorities to generate a mechanism for interim government until elections could be held, possibly before the end of 2004 if security conditions permitted (these were later scheduled for January 2005, a highly optimistic target given the deteriorating security situation throughout 2004). March 19, the Secretary-General decided to dispatch Brahimi to Baghdad again, in response to written requests for assistance by the President of the Iraqi Governing Council and the CPA Administrator, to help form an interim govern-

ment.³⁷ Brahimi briefly appeared to have been ordained kingmaker; he had managed to do what the US could not, engaging with Iraqi society to such an extent that the US had come to rely on him to “cultivate legitimacy for a step-by-step political process”.³⁸ But selection of the Iraqi government was marked by a degree of controversy, when the US-backed Iraqi Governing Council nominated one from their ranks, a former CIA source, Ayad Allawi, as Prime Minister. The broader Government and Cabinet bore the stamp of Brahimi’s consultative diplomacy, with posts carefully allotted to the main religious and ethnic groups, but the impression remained that the US had imposed Allawi and that the UN had been traduced.³⁹ Just one indication of the extent of policy incoherence was the disconnect between the effort put into promulgating a Transitional Administrative Law, signed into force by Paul Bremer on March 8, 2004 and containing many minority protections, and the decision only months later to allow this forward-looking text to lapse at the time of the hand-over to Iraqi sovereignty in deference to Ayatollah Sistani’s reservations over a text that could qualify Shi’a dominance of Iraqi politics in the future.⁴⁰

By mid-2004, the Coalition was rocked by scandals over prisoner abuse, which undermined their claims to the moral high ground. In a sign of how far rhetoric and reality had become divorced, given the UN’s limited role on the ground, on June 8, 2004, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1546 (2004) establishing a multinational force to provide security in Iraq, at the request of the Interim Government of Iraq, and giving the UN a ‘leading and vital role’ – as the US Permanent Representative to the UN and future Ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte described it – in the transition to democracy.⁴¹ On July 12, Annan named the Pakistani Ambassador to Washington, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, as his Special Representative for Iraq, but it was not clear what significant role, if any, he would play.

What next?

Over almost a quarter of a century, the UN has, particularly as a result of its joyless embrace with the US since the end of the Cold War, slid deeper and deeper into the quicksand of Iraq. By 2003 the depth of the crisis had become clear, throwing the role of the UN in maintaining world order starkly into question. While the flexibility and creative potential of the Secretary-General’s good offices were once again demonstrated to be considerable, the Security Council revealed itself prone to both ambiguous (Resolution 1441) and unambiguous but unhelpful (Resolution 1546) compromises that did little to paper over deep splits within the body, instead handing unachievable tasks to the Secretariat. Council pronouncements, often initiated by the occupying powers and weakly resisted at the margins by some other Council members, increasingly smacked of a flight from reality as the situation within Iraq continued to deteriorate.

Nevertheless, recent years of often adverse developments on Iraq suggest possible new directions for the UN in the security sphere in years ahead. The final section of

this article looks at the different challenges confronting the UN and speculates on possible new directions for the UN, centred on its (somewhat tattered) global legitimacy and its (frequently impressive) technical expertise, capitalizing on its network of global regulatory mechanisms and its pivotal, if often unsuccessful, role in state-building. Above all, the reforms must aim to improve the universality of the UN framework, and restore it to its central position as a forum for peaceful resolution of normative differences.

The politics of state-building

Under any scenario, a meaningful UN re-engagement with Iraq will be complex and fraught with normative and operational risk. The impetus to capitalise on the UN’s experience in areas such as security sector reform and justice sector reform will be enormous; but so, too, will the complexity of the task in Iraq. While the UN has been involved in rehabilitating these sectors in failed states, it has never been confronted with the challenges of reforming the massive security apparatus of a police state in a manner consistent with democratization, while, at the same time, seeing off terrorist and ethnic threats to the existence of the state itself against a backdrop of historically entrenched and widespread state corruption.

Perhaps most striking in 2004 was how openly the UN Secretariat became involved with the process of political reconstruction in Iraq. Where the Secretariat and Council subsidiary organs managed the complex regulatory roles of inspections and sanctions prior to the 2003 crisis, the Secretariat’s role after the crisis was one of political brokerage. (Even the search for Iraqi WMD was taken out of UN hands.) Since the end of the Cold War, UN peace operations have also increasingly been mandated in support of internal political processes, the organization of elections and the defence of democracy, for example in Haiti, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan.⁴² Democracy has become both a reason for intervention and an exit strategy: the holding of free and fair national elections, perhaps after a longer democratic process of constitutional reform, marks one of the few clearly-agreed indicators of performance success in complex state-building peace operations.

The evolutionary nature of this change has robbed it of media coverage, although some acute observers in the academic community have advanced helpful analysis, notably Elizabeth Cousens and Karin Wermester, who argue – rightly in our view, though not uncontroversially – that the type of peace building in which the UN engages is much more political in nature than are most developmental programs or narrowly-defined peace-keeping efforts.⁴³ Peace-building now overlaps with state-building, an inherently political exercise, requiring some groups to be favoured over others, and inevitably creating division and perhaps even conflict.⁴⁴ Brahimi’s role in Iraq in the first half of 2004 makes clear that the UN cannot duck the difficult choices involved.

In looking to the future, though – even the immediate future of the UN in Iraq – it is now more widely understood that the process of state-building cannot be narrowly equated with the holding of elections. Electoral assistance – like other specialised programmes run by the UN Secretariat and UN agencies⁴⁵ – has emerged as one of the key competencies of the UN, as the 200 or so related requests for UN involvement received by the UN during the 1990s indicates. At the same time, the reliance on representative democracy carries terrible risks, most clearly illustrated in East Timor in 1999. And the Security Council today understands that one election says little about the sustainability of democracy. The UN's expertise in this field has been on display in the fast and efficient work of Carina Perelli and her staff in Iraq in 2004, although differences in judgment emerged between her ground-up view and the politically-influenced top-down view on offer in New York, where the risks of UN involvement in a bungled exercise weighed more heavily. Her technical report of February 2004⁴⁶ reflected recognition of the complexity of timing elections in post-conflict peace operations: held too early after an internal conflict, they may be hijacked by extremists; held too late, and they may either never be held at all or may serve simply to consolidate the hold on power of those with initial access to government levers. As we write this, the long-touted goal of national elections in January 2005 seems far off; all the UN's expertise will be needed to allow elections to be held safely by that date.

A political conception of state-building requires above all strategic planning, especially to marry the sometimes contradictory objectives of peace-building and state-building. Peace-building may require power-sharing; but power-sharing may prevent democratic state-building. Peace-building may mean incentivizing a turn away from violence, and an acceptance of the status-quo (as in Afghanistan, to a degree); but that status-quo may itself perpetuate a democratic deficit. Conversely, an early emphasis on state-building may inflame unresolved social tensions. In Iraq, for example, the creation by the Coalition of an Interim Governing Council formed with representatives allotted by ethnic and religious quotas – of Shi'a, Sunni and Kurds – may have served to 'entrench and radicalize' existing ethnic and religious identities and tensions.⁴⁷ The Coalition seems to have underestimated the challenge of calibrating these risks through its policies. The UN, with its experience of many post-conflict situations, will be required to do better.

If anything, the difficulties faced by the Coalition in post-war Iraq have only highlighted that the UN is, to adapt a phrase used by former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, the 'indispensable organization' for the political management of international crises involving the interests of several powers (internal and external, with influence of neighbouring countries being a complicating factoring much peace-building).⁴⁸ But the UN's learning curve as 'virtual trustee' has been steep.⁴⁹ The policy content of virtual trusteeship and state-building would benefit from the creation of a strategic planning capability within the UN. Too often, peace operations arise as an ad hoc response by the Security Council to a situation spiralling out of control.⁵⁰ To be

successful, state building must address the connections between conflict prevention and development, between human rights and security.⁵¹ It requires the involvement of actors whose mandate has traditionally been perceived as falling outside that of 'peace operations': the World Bank, UNDP, even the World Health Organization. It requires requiring a more deliberate, whole-of-organization approach, with the Secretary-General and the Security Council providing leadership (and coordination). This approach might require the Council to delegate portions of that role elsewhere within the organization, as the UK, the Netherlands and Italy suggested in 2001 might occur through the Economic and Social Council,⁵² perhaps by creating a subsidiary commission to oversee peace-building.

Normative challenges: rethinking sovereignty

Structural reforms to the UN must adapt it to a changed world order, and will require re-interpretation of traditional norms such as sovereignty. While sovereignty is still the lingua franca of UN diplomatic discourse, the degree of intrusiveness the Security Council was prepared to mandate throughout the 1990s – particularly in Iraq – was striking, responding to a sharp redefinition in practice of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

The growing gap between *de jure* and *de facto* sovereignty fuels perceptions of a North-South divide in world

A political conception of state-building requires above all strategic planning, especially to marry the sometimes contradictory objectives of peace-building and state-building.

politics. It serves to intensify concern that currently fashionable discourses on human rights and humanitarianism serve as a Trojan Horse for the political interests of the North. The UN's increased humanitarian focus is, for the South, a two-edged sword: on the one hand, it offers a basis for arguing that the North should focus its resources as much on dealing with the threats of poverty, deprivation and disease as on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; on the other, it offers the North a platform to argue for greater intervention in Southern countries where they fail to guarantee their citizens' human security. Accordingly, when the Brahimi Report on Peace Operations recommended in 2000 the creation of a new information and strategic analysis unit to enhance conflict prevention activities, representatives of the South worried about the potential intrusiveness of improved UN information management. (In contrast, the North worried about financial, personnel, and materiel over-commitment in the peace-keeping field.) Similarly, contemporary calls for a revival of the Trusteeship Council to deal with situations where the UN is called upon to act as a proxy administration meet with concerns from the South about the resurrec-

tion of Northern colonialist tendencies, and with worries in the North about open-ended financial and military commitments. Many saw the Iraq confrontation as a clash of civilizations; but even more than that, it is about the emerging confrontation between two sets of security needs, between the North – with its justified fear of terrorist assault on its prosperity and political stability – and the South – with its justified fear of poverty, deprivation and disease.

Increasingly, sovereignty is coming to be seen not just as a source of rights, but also as a source of duties to provide security to individuals and groups within society, a ‘Responsibility to Protect’. This idea was born from the Canadian-inspired International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in December 2001.⁵³ However, taking the Responsibility to Protect seriously would have consequences not only for states, but also for the UN, which has recently been sidelined at the operational level by the existence of ‘coalitions of the willing’. (Serious enforcement action now only occurs where there is a militarily capable country or an adequate coalition of countries willing to make available the necessary lift, troops, finance, political capital and military hardware.⁵⁴) Countries working together within “Groups of Friends”, often spanning the North-South divide, can serve to build support at the UN for intervention in specific instances.⁵⁵ They can also help avoid the institutionalization of normative differences like those just discussed. Whether the emerging approach leaning more heavily on front-line action by regional organizations rather than by the UN itself (for example, the Security Council’s response to the crisis in Darfur in 2004) represents a flight from responsibility rather than a sensible division of labour remains an open question.

The structural challenge of unipolarity

Perhaps the greatest imponderable in the future of UN action in Iraq, and more generally on security issues is how US-UN relations will develop. The unipolarity produced by US pre-eminence poses a fundamental challenge to the UN, particularly the Security Council. But if Iraq taught the US and the UN anything, it must surely be the extent to which they need each other. Those who, like Michael J. Glennon, pre-emptively declared the demise of the Security Council,⁵⁶ underestimated the long-term costs of acting outside the Council and the framework of law, not least in terms of financial burden-sharing, of the continuing call on US military assets for the Occupation and of the corresponding reduction in the US’s capacity for credible deterrence of such nations as North Korea and Iran.⁵⁷ But the clash of visions for the UN’s role inherent in speeches by US President George W. Bush and UN Secretary-General Annan before the UN general Assembly on 21 September 2004 suggests continuing trouble for the UN in the second Bush term, however much the US may need the UN instrumentally from time to time.⁵⁸ The Dayton Accord (on Bosnia) of 1995, brokered by Washington, was a turning point in UN affairs, consecrating the US, according to one Security Council Ambassador in early 1996, “the supreme power”.⁵⁹ The challenge for the Security Council in the fu-

ture will remain to engage the United States on the major security challenges without acquiescing in dangerous initiatives; to “have the courage to disagree with the USA when it is wrong and the maturity to agree with it when it is right”.⁶⁰ It must “keep intact its integrity, while improving its effectiveness”.⁶¹ It must assert its indispensability rather than becoming just one coalition among many available to the US.

Iraq suggests the continuing risk for the Council that Washington conceives the UN’s role, at best, as one of long-term peace building following short and sharp US or Western-led military interventions (the latter whether mandated by the Council or not). The UN would be confined to ‘picking up the pieces’, as we see in 2004 in Haiti and Afghanistan, which would undermine the legitimacy – and consequently effectiveness – which the UN retains in the security sphere.

Performance challenges

UN effectiveness is more important to its future than is often thought on the East River. While much attention has focused among delegates on Security Council and other structural reforms to improve perceptions of UN legitimacy, the “performance legitimacy” described by Ramesh Thakur as deriving from good results in the field will be at least equally vital to enhancing the UN’s standing with elite and public opinion around the world.⁶² As we have seen, in some areas, the UN is well-positioned to engage in complex administrative and regulatory tasks, from electoral assistance through to the specialised programmes of the WFP, UNICEF and UNDP. UNSCOM and UNMOVIC also suggest that the UN can – given the right political support – make such a regulatory approach work in the security field. But OFF and the sanctions experience suggest there are also serious risks involved.

The growing operational role of regional organizations in international security, together with new legislative and regulatory roles of the Security Council may point to a new phase in UN peace operations, which, under the best of circumstances, might take shape in the sands of Iraq. From what is already discernable of this new model, the UN might come to play the role of independent arbiter and global security regulator at the apex of a pyramid of regional, local, state and even civil society regulatory mechanisms.⁶³ This pyramidal structure might be governed by a principle of subsidiarity, with successively higher layers taking up the Responsibility to Protect as the layer below fails or is ill-suited to the task. At the same time, it will see the UN Security Council, at the apex of the pyramid, projecting, monitoring and, where necessary, enforcing global security regulation standards.

Where lower layers of the security apparatus fail or are unavailable (for example in much of Asia), this approach would continue to dictate UN operational leadership in the provision of humanitarian assistance or even virtual trusteeship. (The international community’s combination of active and passive approaches to Northern Iraq since 1991

merits some reflection from this perspective.) Elsewhere, the UN's global enforcement strategy may take on a more administrative and bureaucratic sheen, inspired by the inspections-plus-sanctions regime in Iraq in the 1990s, although the difficulties confronted by that project must sound a warning of the need for adequate resourcing and staffing. And in yet other circumstances, the UN's role could simply be one of advice, support and advocacy, working in partnership with governments to improve the lives of their citizens. This is a role for which the UN Development Program working in partnership with other organi-

The UN's biggest roadblock continues to be legitimacy - both in institution and practice. Reform is the name of the game, as the world waits for the High Level Panel to submit its recommendations. Yet this is only where the process begins.

zations and sometimes under the political leadership of the Secretary-General seems well suited.

The UN's experience in post-war Iraq makes clear that expectations of what the UN can achieve there must be carefully managed and tailored.⁶⁴ The operational environment in Iraq stands as a catalogue of all the obstacles which a post-conflict society faces in its transition to stable post-conflict governance: a brutalized and disintegrated population, society and economy, an easy supply of small arms, large numbers of disgruntled soldiers struggling with demobilization and reintegration, ethnic and religious divisions, corruption and terrorism. Additionally, UN state-builders face the challenge of grafting norms that grew out of the European Enlightenment onto societies with entirely different historical legacies.⁶⁵

Restoring universality: avoiding the embedding of normative differences

Behind all of these challenges, the common theme confronting the UN, in all these challenges, is to find ways – through structural and procedural reform, and through normative dialogue – to restore its tattered universality. The sense of crisis produced in 2003 by the quarter-century drama of UN-Iraq engagement reflected concern that normative differences had reached an impasse. The danger is one of embedding these normative differences in social identities, setting a 'unilateralist' US against a 'multilateralist' Europe, setting the global North with its focus on security against the global South with its focus on development, setting Western capitals against Western publics, setting Northern states against Southern social movements such as a growing grassroots Islamism. The power of the UN for the past six decades has been pre-

cisely that it has mediated these normative conflicts, offering groups an international social identity – as members of the UN – larger than identities based purely on these points of conflict. To be sure, normative contestations and even ideological conflict might be conducted *through* the UN, as it was during the Cold War: but without the UN, or something analogous, those contestations would occur on battlefields, and not in informal meeting rooms and formal assembly halls.

Universality cannot be restored unless the UN reforms itself to give the contesting groups a voice in security decision-making. As we have discussed, that will require reforms to the Security Council and other processes that bring the South back in, and that ensure the US perceives benefits for itself from multilateralism. But equally, it may require more creative reforms that allow non-state actors a chance to buy into the process. Brahimi's success in negotiating between local social, religious and ethnic groups and the Coalition states shows that the UN can play this role, given the necessary combination of political backing and creative thinking. But absent such thinking, social and political movements, particularly in the global South, will continue to feel marginalized by and excluded from the UN-centred world order, and will continue to attack it, as they did with devastating effect on August 19, 2003. That risks a slide into an even deadlier quicksand than that in Iraq – a world order structured on a politics of identity, founded on normative, religious and ethnic differences. For six decades, the UN has offered a vision of a world order transcending that sectarianism, racism and other forms of discrimination, a vision of a common political space in which differences could be resolved peacefully. Without careful reform, that vision may be at risk.

If one thing is likely, it is that the sands of Iraq will soon shift again, blurring existing lines for Iraqis, the UN and other international intervenors. That the UN and Iraq will remain engaged with each other in a variety of ways is certain. That the shape, depth and outcome of these links will matter critically to the future of the UN (and other international actors) can be in no doubt.

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¹ See Lawrence Freedman, "War In Iraq: Selling The Threat", *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 7-50

² The phrase is taken from an influential Brookings Institution report, Meghan O'Sullivan, *Iraq: Time for a Modified Approach* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2001).

³ See Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong", *The Atlantic Monthly*, January/February 2004.

⁴ See Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), pp. 83-84, and *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 25.

⁵ Comments of White House spokesman Ari Fleischer, cited in Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, p. 232.

⁶ Lawrence Freedman, "War In Iraq: Selling The Threat", *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 2, Summer 2004, p. 29.

⁷ See Blix, *Disarming Iraq*, pp. 141-142.


⁸ See Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004); and Michael Clarke, "The diplomacy that led to war in Iraq", in Paul Cornish (ed.), *The Conflict in Iraq, 2003* (London, Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004).

- ⁹ See Statement by Secretary of State Powell to Security Council, 5 February 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html>
- ¹⁰ Blix, *Disarming Iraq*, pp. 157, 167.
- ¹¹ Mohammed El Baradei, "The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update", March 7, 2003, available at <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml>
- ¹² See Susan Wright, "The hijacking of UNSCOM", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 1999, vol. 55, no. 4; and see Hans Blix, *Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction* (London: Bloomsbury, 2004).
- ¹³ See John Kampfner, *Blair's Wars* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003).
- ¹⁴ See Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, p. 220.
- ¹⁵ UN Doc. A/57/PV.3 (September 12, 2002).
- ¹⁶ Freedman, "War In Iraq...", p. 39.
- ¹⁷ S/RES/1483 (2003) (May 22, 2003), para. 8.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.* para. 9.
- ¹⁹ See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 1483 (2003), UN Doc. S/2003/715 (July 17, 2003).
- ²⁰ See Dexter Filkins and Raymond Bonner, "Series of Blasts Across Baghdad Kill at Least 15", N.Y. TIMES, Section 1, p. 1, October 27, 2003; and see Alex Berenson, "U.N. Chief Orders Further Reduction of Staff in Baghdad", N.Y. TIMES, Section A, p. 8, September 26, 2003.
- ²¹ UN, *Report of The Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq*, October 20, 2003.
- ²² See UN News Centre, Annan takes strong disciplinary measures after probe reveals security failures in Iraq, March 29, 2004. Annan refused to accept the resignation of Louise Fréchet, who had chaired the Steering Group on Iraq that had recommended the UN's return to Iraq before the August 19, 2003 bombings.
- ²³ See Edith M. Lederer, "U.N. Intends to Hire a Security Firm", *Newsday*, March 4, 2004.
- ²⁴ See Text of letters from the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq Dr. Ayad Allawi and United States Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the President of the Council, Annex to S/RES/1546 (2004), at p. 11.
- ²⁵ See especially *Report on the Fall of Srebrenica*, UN Doc. A/54/549, 15 November 1999; *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, UN Doc. S/1999/1257, 15 December 1999; and the Brahimi Report, *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations*, UN Doc. A/55/305 - S/2000/809 (August 21, 2000), which argued for the primacy of 'impartiality' over 'neutrality' in peace operations.
- ²⁶ Just how high became clear in early May 2004, when Al Qa'eda offered 10 kilograms of gold as a reward to anyone who murdered Annan or his senior Iraq negotiator Lakhdar Brahimi.
- ²⁷ See generally Edward C. Luck, "Tackling Terrorism" in David M. Malone, ed., *The UN Security Council from the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner: 2004), p. 85 and Andrés Franco, "Armed Nonstate Actors" in *ibid.*, p. 117.
- ²⁸ S/RES/1540 (2004) (April 28, 2004).
- ²⁹ See IPA, "The Future of UN State-Building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq", International Peace Academy, New York, December 2003.
- ³⁰ See IPA, *supra* note 30, p. 6.
- ³¹ See Antonio Donini, Norah Niland, and Karin Wermester, eds, *Nation-Building Unraveled? Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004). The removal of Herat Governor and strongman Ismail Khan in September 2004 may signal a greater willingness to extend the rule of law to all of Afghanistan, although it is much too early to tell whether his replacement related tactically to the Presidential election of October 2004 or whether it had broader implications. So, too, it is too early at the time of writing to know whether Hamid Karzai's election as President presages such a movement.
- ³² See Jim Wurst, "U.N. Iraq Envoy Says Security, Electoral Assistance Are Priority", U.N. WIRE, July 23, 2004.
- ³³ See David M. Malone, "UN anger over Iraq: Nobody said it would be safe", *International Herald Tribune*, September 30, 2004.
- ³⁴ See Peter W. Galbraith, "How to Get Out of Iraq", *New York Review of Books*, vol. 51, no. 8, May 13, 2004, and "Iraq: The Bungled Transition", *New York Review of Books*, vol. 51, no. 14, September 23, 2004; Seymour M. Hersh, "Chain of Command", *New Yorker*, May 17, 2004. The abandonment of reconstruction objectives was made obvious to all when the Administration sought Congressional authorization to shift funding from reconstruction to security: see Richard W. Stevenson, "Seeing Threat to Iraq Elections, U.S. Seeks to Shift Rebuilding Funds to Security", *N.Y. Times*, Section A, p. 12, September 14, 2004.
- ³⁵ S/RES/1511 (2003) (October 16, 2003).
- ³⁶ UN News Centre, "Annan asks Security Council for greater clarity on UN role in Iraq", December 16, 2003.
- ³⁷ See Letter dated 18 March 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2004/225 (March 19, 2004). President Bush had earlier met with Brahimi in Washington to ask him to undertake this delicate Mission.
- ³⁸ Edward Joseph, "A balancing act for the UN's Brahimi", *The International Herald Tribune*, May 15, 2004.
- ³⁹ Berdal, "The UN after Iraq", p. 88.
- ⁴⁰ See Peter W. Galbraith, "Iraq: The Bungled Transition", *New York Review of Books*, 23 September 2004.
- ⁴¹ See S/RES/1546 (2004).
- ⁴² For the only clear-cut case in which the Security Council authorized the use of force to restore democracy, see David Malone, "Haiti and the International Community: A Case Study", *Survival*, vol. 39, no. 2, Summer 1997, pp. 126-146. See generally Gregory H. Fox, "Democratization" in Malone, *supra* note 12, p. 69.
- ⁴³ See Elizabeth M. Cousens, Chetan Kumar and Karin Wermester, *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner: 2001). See also Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds, *Ending Civil Wars: The Success and Failure of Negotiated Settlements in Civil War* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner: 2002); and Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela R. Aall, eds, *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World* (USIP, 1999).
- ⁴⁴ See Stephen Stedman, "Introduction", in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens, eds, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
- ⁴⁵ Mats Berdal makes the point that Iraq has highlighted the comparative efficiency of the World Food Programme, UNICEF, UNDP and other UN specialized agencies and programmes: Mats Berdal, "The UN after Iraq", *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 86-87.
- ⁴⁶ See UN Doc. S/2004/140 (February 23, 2004).
- ⁴⁷ IPA, *supra* note 30, p. 8.
- ⁴⁸ See Simon Chesterman, *You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) and also Chesterman, "Bush, the United Nations and Nation-building", *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 101-116.
- ⁴⁹ See Simon Chesterman, "Virtual Trusteeship" in Malone, *supra* note 12, p. 219.
- ⁵⁰ See IPA, *supra* note 30.
- ⁵¹ See, e.g., Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violence Conflict, Final Report*, International Peace Academy, New York, May 2003.
- ⁵² To date efforts by ECOSOC to grapple effectively with peace-building in Haiti and Guinea-Bissau have failed miserably.
- ⁵³ See <http://www.iciss.gc.ca/menu-e.asp>.
- ⁵⁴ Except in Africa, enforcement actions are increasingly advocated, then carried out, by the global North, while traditional peace-keeping operations are executed mostly by the global South. The industrialized countries (especially those in NATO) often provide troops that operate under national, NATO or EU command. The United States effectively operates as a free agent.
- ⁵⁵ One of the key means of securing this cooperative approach to security governance may be reform of the working procedures – if not the structure – of the Security Council. See Teresa Whitfield, "Groups of Friends" in Malone, *supra* note 12, p. 311.
- ⁵⁶ Michael J. Glennon, "Why the Security Council failed", *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2003.
- ⁵⁷ This and many related points are made in a powerful piece by Thomas Franck, "What Happens Now? The UN after Iraq", *American Journal of International Law*, p. 607 (2003).
- ⁵⁸ See UN Doc. A/59/PV.4, September 21, 2004.
- ⁵⁹ Interview with then-Egyptian Ambassador to the UN Nabil Elarabi, January 1996.
- ⁶⁰ Interview with Mexico's then-Ambassador to the UN Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, January 26, 2003.
- ⁶¹ Interview with Michael W. Doyle, New York, May 16, 2003.
- ⁶² See for example Ramesh Thakur, "How to build a better brains-trust", *Globe and Mail*, June 3, 2004.
- ⁶³ Civil society has become increasingly involved in security regulation through mechanisms such as the Global Compact.
- ⁶⁴ See IPA, *supra* note 30, p. 3.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

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